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     áòèé÷ :: Security-alerts
Security-Alerts mailing list archive (security-alerts@yandex-team.ru)

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[security-alerts] FW: Computer Associates eTrust InoTask.exe Antivirus Buffer Overflow Vulnerability and exploit



> -----Original Message-----
> From: binagres@xxxxxxxxx [mailto:binagres@xxxxxxxxx] 
> Sent: Friday, May 11, 2007 4:27 AM
> To: bugtraq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: Computer Associates eTrust InoTask.exe Antivirus 
> Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
> 
> Hi, 
> 
> Here binagres aka (...), for all the "vinagreta" : 
>        
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>       | 48Bits Advisory -=- Privilege Elevation in eTrust 
> Antivirus Agent r8 |
>        
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
>  Affected versions :
> 
>       - eTrust Antivirus Agent r8 - 
> http://www3.ca.com/solutions/Product.aspx?ID=156
>                                    (With INOCORE.DLL 
> 8.0.403.0) under XPSP2 and W2KSP4)
> 
>  Description :
> 
>       eTrust Antivirus r8 is prone to a stack-based buffer 
> overflow vulnerability.
> 
>       The Affected component is "eTrust Task service" running 
> as a Windows service, 
>       the executable file is located at:
> 
>       "%PROGRAMFILES%\CA\eTrustITM\InoTask.exe"
> 
>       eTrust Task service uses a shared file mapping named 
> "INOQSIQSYSINFO" as an 
>       IPC mechanism, this file mapping have a NULL security 
> descriptor so anyone 
>       can view/modify it. This mapping contains information 
> about scheduled tasks,
>       including a field where is specified the file job´s path.
> 
>       The vulnerable code is located at IN0CORE.DLL in the 
> function QSIGetQueueID 
>       which internally calls QSIGetQuePath passing a fixed 
> buffer in order to 
>       retrieve the queue path, no validation is done for the 
> buffer size.
>       
>       In order to exploit the vulnerability, malicious users 
> can modify directly
>       the buffer through the file mapping with a long file 
> path, so when InnoTask 
>       read it the mentioned stack-based buffer overflow will 
> be triggered.
> 
> exploit here : http://www.48bits.com/exploits/etrust.c
> 
> Cheers, 
> 
> binagres
> 
> 
> 



 




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