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     áòèé÷ :: Security-alerts
Security-Alerts mailing list archive (security-alerts@yandex-team.ru)

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[security-alerts] FW: SecureWorks Research Client Advisory: Multiple Vendor Bluetooth Memory Stack Corruption Vulnerability



> -----Original Message-----
> From: Allen Wilson [mailto:awilson@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf 
> Of Research
> Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 5:30 AM
> To: bugtraq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: SecureWorks Research Client Advisory: Multiple 
> Vendor Bluetooth Memory Stack Corruption Vulnerability
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA256
> 
> SecureWorks Research Client Advisory
> Multiple Vendor Bluetooth Memory Stack Corruption Vulnerability
> 
> October 11th, 2006
> 
> Summary:
> 
> A flaw exists in the Toshiba Bluetooth wireless device driver, used by
> multiple vendors, that allows a remote attacker within 
> wireless range of
> a Bluetooth device to perform a denial-of-service (DoS) attack or
> execute arbitrary code at the highest privilege level.
> 
> Scope:
> 
> Toshiba Bluetooth host stack implementations version 3.x
> Toshiba Bluetooth host stack implementations version 4 
> through 4.00.35,
>   including all shipping OEM versions are vulnerable.
> Toshiba Bluetooth stacks running on 64-bit platforms are not 
> vulnerable.
> Toshiba is the OEM for multiple vendor Bluetooth stacks including, but
>   not limited to:
>       - Dell Computers
>       - Sony Vaio
>       - ASUS Computers
>       - and possibly other brands.
> 
> Description:
> 
> Bluetooth is a standards-based wireless technology used for 
> short-range
> data communications between electronic devices.  The vulnerable
> Bluetooth wireless device drivers are subject to potential attacks
> through specially crafted Bluetooth packets.  An attacker can
> potentially take advantage of these conditions to cause a memory
> corruption, a system crash, and/or the execution of arbitrary code at
> the highest privilege level.  An attacker would need to be within
> approximately 10 meters of the victim.  Additionally, an 
> attacker would
> need the Bluetooth address of the victim's device.  Bluetooth 
> addresses
> are easily enumerated through active scanning if the device allows
> discovery.
> 
> Detection:
> 
> Users of Toshiba's Bluetooth stack are encouraged to check the current
> Bluetooth stack version by selecting:
>       Version 3.x - "Device Properties...", then "General"
>       Version 4.x - "Options", then "General", then "Details"
> 
> Toshiba has advised that security patches are normally offered for all
> Bluetooth stacks.  Please consult the download details document for
> further information.
> 
> Users of Dell Bluetooth products are encouraged to verify the presence
> and version of their Bluetooth stack by double-clicking on the
> Bluetooth icon in the system tray to open the Bluetooth client utility
> and selecting "Help", then "About".
> 
> Recommendations:
> 
> Toshiba has recommended that affected users visit their Bluetooth
> vendor's website for an updated Bluetooth stack.  If a patch is
> unavailable, please visit the Toshiba Bluetooth website, which offers
> security updates for all Bluetooth stacks including OEM versions, as
> well as a Bluetooth Stack Security Pack at: 
> http://aps.toshiba-tro.de/bluetooth/redirect.php?page=pages/do
> wnload.php
> 
> Users of Dell Latitude D820/D620/D420/D520 are asked to verify the
> version of their Bluetooth stack using the method described above.  If
> your version is not 4.00.22(D) SP2 or newer, then it is 
> recommended that
> users upgrade to the latest driver versions located at
> http://www.support.dell.com/.
> 
> Users of Dell Latitude D810/D610/D410/D510/X1 are asked to verify the
> version of their Bluetooth stack using the method described above.  If
> your version is not 4.00.20(D) SP2 or newer, then it is recommended
> that users upgrade to the latest driver versions to be made available
> by November 4th, 2006 at http://www.support.dell.com/.
> 
> Bluetooth device users should be set to non-discoverable mode during
> normal operations to reduce risk from this and other potential future
> Bluetooth attacks.
> 
> References:
> SecureWorks Research Client Advisory
> Multiple Vendor Bluetooth Stack Memory Corruption Vulnerability
>       http://www.secureworks.com/press/20061011-dell.html
> 
> Toshiba: Bluetooth Download Page
>      
> http://aps.toshiba-tro.de/bluetooth/redirect.php?page=pages/do
> wnload.php
> 
> Dell Support
>       http://www.support.dell.com/
> 
> Buffer Overrun in Toshiba Bluetooth Stack for Windows
>       http://trifinite.org/trifinite_advisory_toshiba.html
> 
> CVSS Scoring:
> 
>       Access Vector:      Remote
>       Access Complexity:  High
>       Authentication:     Not Required
>       Confidentiality:    Complete
>       Integrity:          Complete
>       Availability:       Complete
>       Impact Bias:        Normal
>       Score:              8.0
> 
> Credits:
> 
> This vulnerability was discovered and researched by David Maynor of
> SecureWorks, Inc. and Jon Ellch.  SecureWorks would like to thank
> Christopher M. Davis and the entire Dell security response 
> team as well
> as Armin Scheruebl of Toshiba Europe GmbH and the Toshiba Bluetooth
> Support team for their response and coordination.
> 
> About Secureworks
> 
> Please direct all security research related inquiries to:
> Allen Wilson
> (404) 417-3717
> research@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> 
> All media inquiries should be directed to:
> Elizabeth Clarke
> (404) 486-4492
> eclarke@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> 
> (c) Copyright 2006 SecureWorks, Inc.
> 
> This advisory may not be edited or modified in any way without the
> express written consent of SecureWorks, Inc.  If you wish to reprint
> this advisory or any portion or element thereof, please contact
> research@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx to seek permission.  Permission is hereby
> granted to link to this advisory via the SecureWorks web-site at 
> http://www.secureworks.com/press/20061011-dell.html or use in
> accordance with the fair use doctrine of U.S. copyright laws.
> 
> Disclaimer: The information within this advisory may change without
> notice.  The most recent version of this advisory may be found on the
> SecureWorks web site at www.secureworks.com for a limited period of
> time.  Use of this information constitutes acceptance for use in an
> AS IS condition.  There are NO warranties, implied or otherwise, with
> regard to this information or its use.  ANY USE OF THIS INFORMATION IS
> AT THE USER'S RISK.  In no event shall SecureWorks be liable for any
> damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the use or
> spread of this information.
> 
> SecureWorks PGP Key available on MIT's PGP key server and 
> PGP.com's key
> server, as well as
> http://www.secureworks.com/researchcenter/publickey.html
> 
> Revision History:
> 1.0; October 11th, 2006 - Initial advisory release
> 
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