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     áòèé÷ :: Security-alerts
Security-Alerts mailing list archive (security-alerts@yandex-team.ru)

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[security-alerts] FW: [VulnWatch] Medium Risk Vulnerability in PGP Desktop



> -----Original Message-----
> From: NGSSoftware Insight Security Research 
> [mailto:nisr@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] 
> Sent: Friday, January 26, 2007 1:31 AM
> To: VulnWatch; Full Disclosure; bugtraq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: [VulnWatch] Medium Risk Vulnerability in PGP Desktop
> 
> Peter Winter-Smith of NGSSoftware has discovered a medium 
> risk vulnerability
> in PGP Desktop which can allow a remote authenticated 
> attacker to execute
> arbitrary code on a system on which PGP Desktop is installed.
> 
> The vulnerability resides within the Windows Service which PGP Desktop
> installs (which operates under the Local System account), and 
> as such it may
> be used by any local or remote user (who must be a member of 
> at least the
> Everyone/ANONYMOUS LOGON groups) to run code with escalated 
> privileges. NGS
> have not been able to exploit this issue in the context of a 
> NULL session.
> 
> The details of this issue are as follows:
> 
> PGP Desktop installs a service (PGPServ.exe/PGPsdkServ.exe) 
> which exposes a
> named pipe '\pipe\pgpserv' (or '\pipe\pgpsdkserv' for the 
> PGPsdkServ.exe
> instance). This pipe is the endpoint for an RPC interface
> (uuid:15cd3850-28ca-11ce-a4e8-00aa006116cb) which takes the following
> format:
> 
> [ uuid(15cd3850-28ca-11ce-a4e8-00aa006116cb),
>   version(1.0),
>   implicit_handle(handle_t rpc_binding)
> ] interface pgpsdkserv
> {
>   error_status_t Function_00(
>         [in] /* [ignore] void * */ long element_1
>   );
> 
>   typedef struct {
>     long element_2;
>     [size_is(element_2)] [unique] byte *element_3;
>   } TYPE_1;
> 
>   error_status_t Function_01(
>         [in] /* [ignore] void * */ long element_4,
>         [in] [size_is(element_6)] byte element_5[*],
>         [in] long element_6,
>         [in] long element_7,
>        [out] [ref] TYPE_1 *element_8
>   );
> }
> 
> This interface is used to marshall various objects and 
> information between
> PGP clients (PGP.dll/PGPsdk.dll) and the PGP service.
> 
> The vulnerability occurs as a result of the fact that the 
> code responsible
> for processing the objects which are passed over the interface to the
> service does not perform any kind of validation on these objects, and
> instead trusts that object data is completely safe in the 
> form that it is
> received (i.e., absolute pointers are trusted without validation).
> 
> NGS have discovered that if the following object is passed over the
> interface as the second parameter to function ordinal 1, an 
> absolute pointer
> is trusted and executed - easily facilitating arbitrary code execution
> inside of the PGP service process:
> 
> /*
> 
> structure passed over rpc:
>     struct {
>         DWORD **pprgMM; // set as absolute pointer to dwUnknown_1
>         DWORD dwUnknown_1; // set as absolute pointer to 'rgMM'
>         DWORD dwCount; // set to value 0
>         DWORD dwFGUB_signature; // set to value 'FGUB'
>         DWORD dwUnknown_2; // set to value 'rgMM'
>         DWORD dwUnknown_3;
>         DWORD dwUnknown_4;
>         DWORD dwUnknown_5;
>         DWORD dwUnknown_6;
>         PBYTE pbFunction; // set to absolute address of shellcode
>         // etc...
>     };
> 
> */
> 
> This issue has been resolved as of PGP Desktop 9.5.1 and NGS 
> recommend that
> all users download the updated version from the PGP website:
> 
> http://www.pgp.com/
> 
> NGSSoftware Insight Security Research
> http://www.ngssoftware.com
> http://www.databasesecurity.com/
> http://www.nextgenss.com/
> +44(0)208 401 0070
> 
> 
> --
> E-MAIL DISCLAIMER
> 
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> correspondence is private, is solely for the intended recipient(s) and
> may contain confidential or privileged information. For those 
> other than
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> other action taken, or omitted to be taken, in reliance on such
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> 
> NGS and NGSSoftware are trading names of Next Generation Security
> Software Ltd. Registered office address: 52 Throwley Way, Sutton, SM1
> 4BF with Company Number 04225835 and VAT Number 783096402
> 



 




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